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GOD'S NATURE AND THE RATIONALITY OF 
RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
Chris Eberle 
If something like Reformed Epistemology is correct, an agent is innocent in 
regarding certain ways of forming beliefs to be reliable until those ways have 
been proven guilty. An important species of argument purporting to show 
guilt (1) identifies the ways of forming beliefs at the core of our cognitive activ-
ity, (2) isolates the features of our core practices which account for their relia-
bility, and (3) determines whether or not peripheral practices which ought to 
have those features enjoy at least their functional equivalents. An example. 
Sense perception is at the heart of our cognitive activity; a feature of sense-per-
ception which provides us with confidence in its reliability is that we can sub-
ject sense-perceptual beliefs to intersubjective criticism - others can check our 
beliefs. Beliefs about God formed on the basis of religious experience cannot 
be so checked and therefore lack positive epistemic status. 
An important response to such criticism consists of arguing that the differ-
ence between two ways of forming beliefs is just what we should expect given 
some relevant difference between the subject matters of those two ways of 
forming beliefs. This species of response employs what I call 'the Ontological 
Principle,' viz., that the nature or characteristics of an object constrain the way 
an agent ought to form beliefs about that object. 
In this paper, I attempt to provide a rationale for the Ontological Principle. 
I argue as follows. Any epistemic norm which requires of an agent that she 
enter into causal relations with an object which she cannot in the 'nature' of 
the case enter lacks epistemic merit - it violates the ought implies can dictum. 
Because the epistemic norms properly governing the cognitive activity of a 
given agent are constrained by the causal relations possible between an agent 
and an object of belief, and because the causal relations possible between an 
object of belief and an agent are determined in part by the characteristics of the 
object of belief, the epistemic norms properly governing the cognitive activity 
of a given agent are determined in part by the characteristics of the object of 
belief. That is, the Ontological Principle is true. 
I 
"Reformed Epistemologists" Plantinga, Alston and Wolterstorff have 
argued, successfully by my lights, for the following position. (1) Every 
cognitive agent cannot but rely on a set of belief-forming practices, e.g., 
sense-perception, introspection, memory and testimony, for which she can 
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provide no non-circular discursive justification. (2) The most powerful and 
venerable set of restrictions demarcating the belief-forming practices which 
require discursive redemption from those which do not, viz., classical 
foundationalism, is self- referentially incoherent, unduly restrictive, or 
arbitrary. (3) Once the vicissitudes of classical foundationalism are 
exposed, there is no reason why a religious way of forming beliefs ought 
not count as one of those practices in which an agent may engage without 
providing discursive justification for so doing. Religious practices of form-
ing beliefs enjoy a presumptive innocence. (4) That a belief-forming practice 
enjoys a presumptive innocence does not insure those who engage in that 
practice of "diplomatic immunity" from critical reflection; rather, critical 
reflection assumes the burden of a proof of guilt. Religious practices of 
forming beliefs are innocent until proven guilty. 
Critics frequently attempt to show guilt by comparison criticism. The 
structure of comparison criticism is as follows (we will attend to some of 
the content shortly). Consider two practices, Alpha and Beta. Suppose 
that we are justly confident of Beta's trustworthiness, that it gives rise to a 
sufficiently high proportion of true to false beliefs. We have identified var-
ious epistemic excellences which Beta possesses and are justly confident 
that its possession of those excellences accounts for Beta's providing us 
with access to reality. Alpha, however, lacks one of those excellences, E, or 
any functionally equivalent excellence for E. If both Alpha and Beta ought 
to have some such excellence, we infer (ceteris paribus) that the epistemic 
status Alpha enjoys is lower than that enjoyed by Beta; and if E is a particu-
larly important property, we may conclude that Alpha enjoys no positive 
epistemic status whatsoever. In short, by comparing what we know about 
the kinds of activities that put one in touch with the truth with what we 
know about the way in which practitioners of Alpha form beliefs, we 
attempt to determine whether or not forming beliefs in the Alpha-type 
way is a good thing from the epistemic point of view. 
Comparison criticism is an important species of argumentation,' partic-
ularly if the Reformed strategy (or some relevantly similar strategy) is ulti-
mately defensible. Why? Comparison criticism enables us to engage in 
critical reflection in a principled manner even given the limitations 
imposed on us by our inability to attain a Cod's-eye view of our epistemic 
situation. One who levels such a critique is free to admit what many pro-
ponents of "naturalistic epistemology" have been urging, viz., that none 
of us has any idea of the features of a practice that facilitate reliable belief 
formation other than by engaging in actual ways of forming beliefs. By 
engaging in ways of forming beliefs to which we cannot but impute a pre-
sumptive innocence, we are able to acquire some understanding of how 
we can come into contact with reality. We may subsequently employ that 
understanding to criticize other ways of forming beliefs. 
Unfortunately, comparison criticism harbors potential for the uncriti-
cal rejection of legitimate practices of forming beliefs. The crucial prob-
lem for any such criticism is to show of an excellence E internal to one 
practice that another practice which in fact lacks E ought to have E. 
Although E may be crucial to one practice's capacity to put an agent in 
touch with reality, the very same excellence may be superfluous or even 
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counterproductive for a different practice. To reject the latter practice 
because it lacks E would be a travesty. 
Many religious apologists attempt to defuse comparison criticism by 
articulating what they take to be the epistemic constraints imposed on 
an agent by the nature of that about which they form beliefs. They 
appeal, in short, to what I shall call the Ontological Principle, viz., that 
the way in which we form beliefs about an object ought to be con-
strained by the nature of that object. Whether or not we ought to require 
of a given practice that it have some excellence E depends, in part, on 
the nature of that about which members of that practice form beliefs. 
Now the Ontological Principle has a great deal of intuitive plausibility 
and, as a consequence, those who employ it do not, apparently, believe 
that they need to justify that principle. I will attempt to remedy that 
oversight in this essay. 
The path we will travel to get to that point, however, will be some-
what circuitous. In the next section, I articulate a familiar comparison 
criticism of a very common religious belief-forming practice, viz., that of 
forming beliefs about God on the basis of "religious experience." In the 
third section, I will relate a powerful response to that criticism, one 
which essentially employs the Ontological Principle. In section four, I 
explain what I mean by that principle and then, in section five, provide 
several illustrations intended to motivate interest in that principle. Only 
in the sixth and seventh sections do I provide reason to believe that it is 
true. In section eight, I return to the topic of comparison criticism and 
attempt to identify the promising strategy the Ontological Principle 
holds for the religious apologist faced with such a criticism. And in a 
concluding section, I mention several issues I fail to resolve in the ensu-
ing discussion. 
II 
William Alston claims that there is a way of forming beliefs, mystical 
perception, in which "the experience, or as I shall say, the perception of 
God, plays a role with respect to beliefs about God importantly analo-
gous to that played by sense-perception with respect to beliefs about the 
physical world."2 Mystical Perception (MP) is a socially established way 
of forming beliefs about God on the basis of putative manifestations of 
God to the believer; MP is what Alston calls a doxastic practice (DP). A 
doxastic practice is constituted both by a family of dispositions to form 
beliefs with a certain content upon being in a certain kind of mental state 
as well as a set of beliefs and procedures by which an agent may deter-
mine whether beliefs with initial credibility deserve continued adher-
ence. (Alston calls this latter feature of a doxastic practice its overrider 
system.) Following the Reformed strategy, Alston argues that MP enjoys 
the presumptive innocence we have no reason not to accord to any and 
every fundamental way of forming beliefs. Each human being forms 
beliefs by engaging in the standard package of sense-perception, intro-
spection, rational intuition, and memory; we have as yet no sound, non-
circular argument which shows that any of those basic practices are reli-
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able; and yet we are epistemically justified in regarding them as reliable 
so long as we have no reason to think otherwise. Similarly for MP; any 
agent who engages in MP is entitled to regard it as reliable without 
argument unless provided with reason to regard it as unreliable. 
And attempts to prove its guilt are certainly forthcoming. Consider 
the following. Alston denies that perception of God is self-authenticat-
ing, incorrigible, indubitable, or any other property of that ilk. Any DP 
worth its salt is one in which agents are capable of determining whether 
or not grounds which ordinarily indicate the truth of some belief do, in 
this instance, so indicate. Because our beliefs are defeasible, every legiti-
mate DP must allow for the distinction between prima facie and ultima 
facie justification. In order for an agent so to distinguish, she needs to 
have at her disposal tests whereby beliefs with initial credibility (prima 
facie justification) may be checked for justification all things considered 
(ultima facie justification). That is, every DP must, on pain of epistemic 
illegitimacy, enjoy an adequate overrider system. 
Various critics of MP argue that its overrider system is not an ade-
quate means for evaluating manifestation beliefs (or M-beliefs, those 
formed on the basis of a putative manifestation of God to the believer).3 
Why? Compare it to the overrider system of a DP at the core of our cog-
nitive activity and which we are compelled to regard as reliable. 
Consider sense-perception's (SP) overrider system, as it relates to check-
ing the reports of others that they have perceived some object. When an 
agent claims to have seen a snark in the woods, we have means of check-
ing her assertion: we follow her trail back to the place where she claimed 
to have seen the snark, search for evidence of snarks (footprints, stoot 
cigarette butts, etc.), and make our determination on the basis of what 
any of us can discern. If her story fails to check out after the appropriate 
kind of investigation, then we regard her assertion as false, and the 
utterer of that assertion as deceptive, deluded, mistaken, credulous, etc. 
Our confidence in making that judgment is based on the fact that the 
objects of SP are publicly available, i.e., that which one agent claims to 
have perceived is perceivable (in principle) by any of us and by our 
employing the same cognitive faculties she would have had to employ 
were she to have perceived a snark. Because the objects of SP are pub-
licly available, all who engage in SP can in principle agree upon the con-
ditions in which it is possible to perceive them. And because the condi-
tions in which it is possible to perceive objects may be determined by 
any practitioner of SP, claims about those objects are intersubjectively 
evaluable. Anyone can evaluate sense-perceptual claims and can evalu-
ate them by appeal to criteria everyone can agree on. In short, because 
we can "specify conditions under which the experience of one subject is 
relevant to the confirmation or disconfirmation of the perceptual report 
of another subject/' we are able to engage "in the critical examination of 
sense-perceptual reports."4 
That sense-perceptual beliefs are inter subjectively evaluable substan-
tiates our confidence in the presumptive innocence of SP. Why? The 
heart of the answer is simple: human beings are fallible; by having other 
agents check our assertions, agents who may lack our particular epis-
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temic vices, we raise the probability that a given perceptual belief is true. 
The public availability of the objects of perception renders us able more 
adequately to assess the beliefs formed about those objects, and thus 
increases our confidence in the truth of particular judgments. If, for this 
reason, we are rightly confident of most of the judgments we make by 
engaging in SP, we are rightly confident of SP's reliability. 
Obviously, those who engage in MP enjoy no such intersubjective 
evaluation of M- beliefs. Why? Because God is not available under con-
ditions participants in MP may determine as those in which an agent 
typically perceives God. We have no idea under what conditions God 
presents himself to an agent's consciousness, and therefore have no idea 
where, when, and how God manifests himself, and therefore cannot dis-
confirm an agent's claim that this has in fact happened. And this counts 
against the epistemic standing of MP: the lack of adequate checks to M-
belief formation renders MP suspect. 
Clearly, the objection with which Alston is concerned is a species of 
comparison criticism. Those who engage in MP cannot subject their M-
beliefs to intersubjective evaluation, whereas those who engage in SP 
can. That our sense-perceptual beliefs can be subjected to intersubjective 
criticism - not to mention that they routinely are and come off pretty 
well on the whole - confirms the confidence we initially place in its 
reliability. That M-beliefs are not so subject, and that they lack any func-
tional equivalent for intersubjective criticism, renders MP suspect. 
III 
As I noted previously, the vulnerable step in a comparison criticism 
will be the claim that a DP which lacks a given feature must have that 
feature in order to enjoy positive epistemic status. Alston's response 
focuses on just that step. The objection, according to Alston, is a "glar-
ing example of epistemic imperialism."s The critic proposes to impose 
on agents who engage in MP procedures for checking beliefs properly 
required only of SP. 
The crucial point is the following. In order to determine which proce-
dures are appropriate for the overrider system of a given DP, one cannot 
but appeal to the beliefs already formed via that practice. For example, 
there is no way to determine a priori which procedures will allow us to 
check beliefs formed about the natural environment without relying on 
our prior knowledge of what the natural world is like. As a conse-
quence of engaging in SP, we learn that the natural environment is com-
posed of enduring physical objects which casually interact with other 
physical objects in a lawlike manner. Because we have acquired knowl-
edge of the regularities exhibited by objects in the natural environment, 
we may therefore isolate the conditions in which it is possible for a given 
agent to perceive a given object. And having learned that, we justifiably 
judge that the intersubjective evaluability of claims about the objects of 
sense perception is a sine qua non of any genuine practice of forming 
beliefs about the natural world. In short, according to Alston, "it is on 
the basis of what SP has revealed to us about the nature of its subject 
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matter that we take its deliverances to be subject to assessment in terms 
of the perceptions of properly qualified others./16 
Just as with SP, those who engage in MP cannot but, and, therefore, may,legit-
imately employ that practice to construct an understanding of its subject matter in 
order to determine what may appropriately be required of their practice's over-
rider system. Determining what tests are required in order to corroborate or to 
discredit M-beliefs is a circular process: agents form an understanding of God's 
nature and purposes, as well as the way He interacts with those who perceive 
Him, and on the basis of that understanding formulate procedures for checking 
M- beliefs. These procedures are subsequently employed to evaluate the M-
beliefs of those who engage in MP and, indeed, perhaps those very beliefs on the 
basis of which a given procedure was deemed appropriate. 
Of what relevance is this to the objection at hand? The understanding 
of God internal to MP is that of a sovereign, immaterial being who pre-
sents Himself non-sensorily and (for all we can tell) non-systematically 
to human beings. While the beliefs formed on the basis of those percep-
tions reveal that God possesses enduring virtues like compassion and 
justice, they reveal no dependable regularities in the way God interacts 
with human beings which render possible predictions of divine manifes-
tations. Indeed, the understanding of God internal to MP provides those 
who engage in that practice with reason to believe that God's action 
exhibits no regularities of the sort proper to SP and thus no basis for pre-
dictions. Therefore, our being unable to test M- beliefs in the manner 
appropriate to SP cannot count as a good reason to regard it as unreli-
able. Rather, the understanding of God internal to MP warrants us in 
regarding this objection as imperialistic. Alston concludes: 
The upshot of all this is that while what we have learned about 
the physical world from SP gives us the wherewithal to hold 
particular perceptual reports subject to a decisive test in terms of 
what relevant others perceive, what we have learned from God 
and His relations to His creation, from [MP] and other sources, 
gives us reason to suppose that no such tests are available here. 7 
IV 
Alston's response employs what I have found to be a fairly common 
tactic amongst religious apologists. Alston appeals to what I have called 
The Ontological Principle: the nature of God differs from the nature of 
physical objects, and that difference justifies us in claiming that M-
beliefs ought not be held accountable to the kind of intersubjective criti-
cism properly imposed on sense-perceptual beliefs. Thomas Torrance, 
another religious apologist who wields the Ontological Principle to 
defend religious belief, writes, 
It is always the nature of things that must prescribe for us the 
specific mode of rationality that we must adopt toward them, 
and prescribe also the form of verification apposite to them, and 
therefore it is a major part of scientific activity to reach clear con-
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victions as to the distinctive nature of what we are seeking to 
know in order that we may develop and operate with the dis-
tinctive categories demanded of us.8 
As Alston employs the Ontological Principle to defend religious experi-
ence as a source of justified belief about God, Torrance employs that 
principle to defend revelation as a source of justified belief about God. 
Canonically put, the Ontological Principle is the claim that, 
(OP): the characteristics of an object ought to constrain the 
norms an agent employs to evaluate the beliefs she forms 
about that object. 
Several notes by way of exposition. First, the Ontological Principle, 
as formulated, is completely general. It applies to beliefs about objects of 
any sort, not just to beliefs formed about God. So, although religious 
apologists may, and do, employ it to happy effect, those concerned with 
the epistemic imperialism visited upon non-religious ways of forming 
beliefs are free to do the same. (I believe that a fuller appreciation of OP 
would render disputes central to the philosophy of social science and of 
mind more fruitful.) 
Second, by object, I do not only mean an independently existing, dis-
crete entity, of the sort paradigmatically exemplified by the typical chair, 
banana, etc. Mental states are "objects" about which agents form beliefs, 
as are social institutions, none of which exist independently of human 
cognizers, and yet their distinctive ontological makeup imposes con-
straints on the way a rational agent forms beliefs about them. By object, 
then, I mean the subject matter about which an agent forms beliefs, or 
even more prosaically, whatever it is about which an agent forms beliefs. 
Third, characteristics should be understood broadly, to include not just 
the ontological makeup of an object of belief, the stuff of which it is com-
posed, but also the form that stuff takes.9 Birds and plants may be com-
posed of the same stuff, but, because that stuff is organized very differ-
ently in plants than in animals, the way in which a rational agent forms 
beliefs about them differs significantly. This becomes particularly impor-
tant when we concern ourselves with the way we ought to form beliefs 
about God. The characteristics of God which impose constraints on us 
are not just, though they certainly include, God's incorporeal nature and 
God's transcendence; they also include the ways in which God has decid-
ed to communicate information otherwise unknowable to us. That is, 
they include the intentions and purposes God, as a free agent, pursues. 
Fourth, the characteristics of an object constrain the norms an agent 
ought to employ to evaluate her beliefs, but they do not determine exact-
ly what those norms are. Only some of the norms which are improperly 
employed to evaluate the epistemic status of a given type of belief are 
rendered improper by the object's nature and characteristics. Some are 
improper because, for example, an agent does not have access to the 
cognitive apparatus which is a condition of forming beliefs in the way 
required by a given norm. (In the terminology developed later, both 
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practice- and object-imposed constraints exclude epistemic norms.) 
Fifth, to affirm of a norm that it is improperly employed to evaluate 
beliefs of a certain sort is not to claim that beliefs of that sort are subject to 
entirely different norms than those proper to other practices. It is to 
claim that there are some legitimate differences between one practice and 
others, not that the former is absolutely different from the latter. All 
practices, for example, are no doubt subject to the laws of logic; every 
practice which gives rise to massive amounts of self-contradictory beliefs 
cannot be reliable and thus is epistemically out of bounds. Amongst the 
norms internal to the overrider systems of distinct doxastic practices, 
then, there will be similarity and difference, unity and plurality. 
As I noted above, neither Torrance nor Alston provide a rationale for 
OP; they rely on its intuitive power, even though it plays a crucial role in 
their apologetic agenda. I will present a rationale for that principle, and, 
briefly, indicate the way in which it may be employed to diffuse com-
parison criticisms of religious belief. 
v 
Before articulating a rationale for OP, I will present several examples I 
hope will render plausible the claim that some such principle is true 
(whether or not I have successfully identified what that is.) 
Suppose that I saw a Venus Fly trap in the forest and I tell you about it, 
but you don't believe me. I can verify my belief if I retrace my steps until 
we return to the location at which I claim to have seen the Fly trap. If we 
cannot find the plant, witness no signs of its removal, and are not delu-
sional or otherwise incapacitated, my claim to have seen the plant will 
have been compromised. If, however, I claim to have seen a rare species 
of bird, you don't believe that I have, you insist on returning to the loca-
tion at which I claim to have seen the bird, you direct your attention to 
the very branch on which the bird was resting when I saw it, refuse to 
grant that my belief is true, and cite as grounds that the bird is not where 
I said it was, you are simply being unreasonable. Why? Plants are sta-
tionary; birds move. You insist on employing procedures to substantiate 
bird-beliefs that are proper to plant-beliefs and the like. We reasonably 
investigate claims about the latter in ways it would be irrational to inves-
tigate the former just because the first kind of object interacts with our 
cognitive faculties in a different way than does the second. 
Consider another example. If there is a God, God is not a physical 
object. If there is a planet orbiting Alpha Centauri, it is a physical object. 
In virtue of God's essentially incorporeal nature, God can not reflect 
light. In virtue of its corporeal nature, the planet orbiting Alpha Centauri 
can. If we want to determine whether or not there is a planet orbiting 
Alpha Centauri, we hire an astronomer with an unbelievably powerful 
telescope; if the telescope is powerful enough, the astronomer skilled 
enough, and there actually is a planet there, she will detect it. If she does-
n't, we conclude that Alpha Centauri is planetless. But no matter how 
powerful the telescope, no matter how assiduously the astronomer 
scours the heavens, she cannot expect to detect God amongst the celestial 
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beings she perceives. If she does not detect God, and thus concludes on 
that basis that the universe is godless, she is irrational. 
Of course, not every example is as clear cut as are those mentioned in 
the previous paragraphs. For another example, and a more controver-
sial one, consider the longstanding debate between those who believe 
that human actions are events of a sort different than human behaviors 
and that the properties making for that difference impose constraints on 
the way that we form beliefs about actions, constraints from which we 
are free when forming beliefs about bodily movements. I can determine 
without having any knowledge of an agent's intentions or beliefs 
whether or not water is poured from her hand on to her child's head; I 
cannot determine without access to her beliefs and intentions whether or 
not she is baptizing her baby. Because an agent's beliefs determine in 
part which action she performs, those who form beliefs about another 
agent's actions must have access to the latter's beliefs. The observer 
needs to find some way to determine what the actor's beliefs are and 
that cannot be accomplished merely by observing the relevant agent's 
physical movements. Thus, in order reliably to form beliefs about an 
agent's actions, we need to interpret (understand, empathize with, etc.) 
what that agent does, where interpretation (understanding, empathiz-
ing, etc.) is a very different kind of cognitive activity than that in which 
we must engage in order reliably to form beliefs about an agent's physi-
cal movements. Once again, because of a relevant difference between 
two objects of belief (in this case, two events), the epistemic desiderata 
proper to beliefs formed about one object properly differ from those 
formed about the other. 
It seems to me that Charles Taylor, in his many writings on the phi-
losophy of social science, theory of interpretation, etc. employs - with-
out explicitly articulating, so far as I can tell - the Ontological Principle 
in defending the legitimacy of a non-scientistic approach to the way in 
which we form beliefs about human action. According to Taylor, 
human beings are very different kinds of entities than are, say, lem-
mings. Human beings are self-interpreting animals, because our beliefs 
about ourselves determine in part who we are and what we are. IO 
Lemmings lack beliefs about themselves, and hence none of their charac-
teristics depend on their beliefs. This difference has great importance, 
according to Taylor, for the kind of checks and constraints we employ to 
evaluate theories about human agents and those we employ to evaluate 
theories about lemmings. l1 Because human beings are self-interpreting 
animals, the theories that a scientist forms about a human being can 
change the way a human being thinks of herself, thus altering the object 
of study in a way that the scientist doesn't alter the lemming when she 
studies it. As a consequence, the kind of exact prediction proper to theo-
ries in the hard sciences is not properly expected of beliefs in the social 
sciences.12 Hence, it would be unreasonable to reject a theory formed 
about persons because it does not admit of disconfirmation through 
failed prediction. Rather, disconfirmation of social scientific theories 
ought to be evaluated in light of criteria internal to hermeneutics.13 To 
require of theories about self-interpreting animals that they be subject to 
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the kinds of checks properly imposed on natural scientific theories 
would be imperialistic.14 
VI 
Each of the preceding scenarios exemplifies the Ontological Principle 
in action. Epistemic desiderata proper to one doxastic practice are 
rejected as imperialistic impositions on another, and at the heart of the 
rationale for such rejection is a recognition of the epistemic relevance of 
some difference between the objects of belief. Illustrations are helpful, 
but are there principled considerations supporting the Ontological 
Principle? I think that there are. 
If we are to form our beliefs in such a way as to achieve our central 
epistemic aim, viz., to achieve a high ratio of true to false beliefs, we 
must acquire information about the objects of our belief. The beliefs we 
form about an object must be generated from information about that 
object if our believing truly is not to be a lucky accident and thus a fail-
ure to discharge our central epistemic aim. We engage in various prac-
tices by which we gather information and thereby form beliefs: sense-
perception, testimony, introspection, memory. Constructed as she is, 
the typical human being is capable of acquiring information about 
objects in her vicinity via the stimulation of her visual receptors by light 
generated or reflected by those objects, of her auditory receptors by 
sound waves reflected by those objects, of her olfactory receptors by 
odoriferous particles emitted by those objects, etc. Our five senses are 
not our only sources of information. We acquire information about our 
feelings, beliefs, desires, and the like not by sensory stimulation but by 
introspecting. And although memory and testimony are parasitic on 
other belief-forming practices for their inputs, and thus are not basic 
sources of beliefs, they are basic sources of epistemic justification. IS That 
is, memory and testimony are sources of information inaccessible to an 
agent unless she engages in those practices. 
To be sure, if there are some objects discoverable by a sixth sense for-
ever unattainable by those endowed with a constitution like ours, then it 
is impossible for us reliably to form beliefs about those objects. If some 
kinds of emotion are detectable only by the empathetic powers enjoyed 
by (so far as we know) science fictional characters, then agents (like us) 
who lack those powers are unable to acquire trustworthy information 
about those kinds of emotion. Although by rank speculation we may 
happen upon some truth or two, the means at our disposal are not con-
ducive to an agent's discharging her central epistemic obligation with 
respect to those emotions. 
That we are capable of engaging in certain practices but not others, 
then, imposes constraints on the way in which we can form beliefs. As 
finite epistemic agents, we can engage only in certain practices and thus 
may reliably form beliefs about only certain kinds of things. A bit of ter-
minological legerdemain: I shall call any such constraint a practice-
imposed constraint. A practice-imposed constraint is any limitation on 
the way in which an agent can acquire information to which she is sub-
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ject in virtue of the belief-forming practices available (or unavailable) to 
her. 
There are various sources of practice-imposed constraints. The most 
important source is an agent's constitution. Those outfitted with a well-
functioning visual apparatus but not the means to form beliefs via sonar 
cannot form beliefs in the way that bats form beliefs. Human beings 
form beliefs about other people's beliefs principally by relying on testi-
mony; those with the capacity to read minds are not so limited. Of 
course, an agent's constitution may be both extended and altered. An 
agent may employ her visual apparatus to form beliefs about subatomic 
particles by employing an electron microscope, a possibility foreclosed 
to those without the requisite technology. Those who enjoy the fruits of 
such technological sophistication have open to them possibilities inac-
cessible to the less fortunate. And it is but a short step from extending 
an agent's physical constitution to altering it. Perhaps future scientists, 
either via genetic engineering or some drastic operation, will be able to 
equip human beings with the ability to generate beliefs via sonar in 
addition to their normal visual capacities. The moral of the story is sim-
ply that every cognitive agent (save perhaps God) is subject to practice-
imposed constraints but that we ought not be too confident about what 
those limitations are. 
For certain of our core doxastic practices, the transmission of the 
information from that about which we form beliefs to our capacities 
requires that we be causally related to those objects. In order to acquire 
the information required to form our beliefs reliably, we must enter into 
causal relations of some sort with that about which we form beliefs.l(, (I 
realize that these are treacherous waters, but there is nothing for it but to 
swim on, leaving the requisite qualifications for another venue.) Our 
intuitions about particular doxastic practices bears this out. Whatever 
the difficulties of the causal theory of perception, that an agent is causal-
ly related to the object putatively perceived is a necessary condition of 
any genuine perception of that object. An agent who forms a true belief 
about an object 0 on the basis of sensory impressions which accurately 
represent 0 does not succeed in perceiving 0, and thus in reliably form-
ing a perceptual belief about 0, if 0 does not playa suitable causal role 
in the generation of her belief. Thus, suppose that I am seated in front 
of a large black-bellied stove, that I am having a visual experience as of 
such a stove, an experience generated by the stimulation of my visual 
receptors by light reflected from that stove, and that I thereby form the 
belief that there is in fact a large stove in front of me. So long as nothing 
bizarre occurs in the transpiring of those events, I no doubt form my 
belief reliably; so long as I have no reason to believe that anything fishy 
is going on, and so long as nothing fishy in fact occurs, I can hardly be 
anything but justified in forming beliefs as I do. But if someone, unbe-
knownst to me, slips an incredibly lifelike painting of the stove in 
between me and the stove, so that my visual perception of the painting 
gives rise to a visual experience phenomenologically indistinguishable 
from the visual experience I would have had when actually perceiving 
the stove, then I can hardly be said to be perceiving the stove and cer-
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tainly not forming my beliefs reliably. The break in the causal chain 
originating with the stove and terminating in the stimulation of my sen-
sory faculties precludes my having the kind of purchase on an object 
requisite for information gathering and thus reliable belief formation. 
Similarly with other DPs. Suppose that ego stoked the fire in the pot-
bellied stove, that alter saw him stoke the stove, that as a consequence 
alter believed that he stoked the stove, and that alter continues to believe 
the same because she remembers that ego stoked the stove. Once again, 
barring bizarre circumstances, alter no doubt forms her beliefs reliably 
and justifiably. If, however, alter's memory of the event was wiped out 
as a consequence of severe brain damage suffered in a car accident, a 
further consequence of which is that she seems to recall vividly many 
events which never in fact occurred, and if alter recalls vividly that ego 
in fact stoked the stove, but does so as a consequence of her abnormal 
neurophysiological condition, then she has not in fact formed her beliefs 
about that event reliably. The requisite causal connection between past 
events and present recollection has been severed, rendering unreliable 
what would normally have been a reliable indication of the truth. 
Or suppose that ego stoked the stove and mentioned that fact to sev-
eral other folks who related the story to alter, who thereby formed the 
belief that ego stoked the fire. So long as the "transmission chain" link-
ing alter to ego wends its way through the requisite competent authori-
ties, alter's belief most likely enjoys justification.17 Suppose, however, 
that during the transmission of testimonial authority, an English speaker 
fully in mastery of her native language, utters to a French speaker that 
"Ego stoked the stove." If the latter lacks the capacity to understand any 
language other than her own, she cannot testify authoritatively to the 
claim that ego stoked the stove. Suppose that the French speaker enjoys 
the way "Ego stoked the stove" sounds, and persists in repeating it 
whenever she is addressed by English speakers. If alter happens to see 
her, and believes that she knows something about the event in question, 
and thus asks her if Ego stoked the stove (in English), and if our French 
speaker responds by uttering the sounds liE go stoked the stove," the 
belief that alter forms thereby does not count as epistemically justified. 
Although there is a connection of some sort between ego's stoking the 
fire and alter's believing that ego stoked the fire, the connection is not of 
the appropriate sort; it is not the sort of causal connection between the 
object of belief and the believer which undergirds our testimonial DP. 
So, then, if an agent is to form beliefs reliably, she must be capable of 
acquiring information about the object of her beliefs. The ways she has of 
requiring information are constrained by the DPs available to her. In 
order for the DPs available to her to enable her to acquire information, she 
must be causally related in an appropriate way to the object of her belief. 
No causal relation results in no information, and thus arbitrary belief. 
If the ways in which we can reliably form beliefs are constrained by 
the kinds of causal underpinnings internal to the DPs available to us, 
they are further constrained by the kinds of causal relationships into 
which different objects of belief can enter. Given that human beings 
have the capacity visually to perceive physical objects, the characteristics 
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of different physical objects constrain the ways in which human beings 
can reliably form beliefs about those objects. Birds move around a lot; 
plants are stationary. In virtue of that difference, beliefs formed about 
birds must be checked very differently than those about plants. It isn't 
possible for an actual human being reliably to form beliefs about both 
birds and plants if she insists on checking both kinds of belief by 
employing the same set of procedures. Reliable belief formation is con-
strained by the characteristics of the object of belief. 
Consider another example. Suppose that there exists a very strange 
artifact, the Holy Grail, which has the property that any cognitive agent 
who perceives that object is afflicted with permanent amnesia about its 
existence and location upon forming any belief about it. In virtue of its 
having that property, the Grail would be unable to enter into those causal 
relations partly constitutive of both our mnemonic and testimonial DPs. 
Clearly any objects about which we have amnesia are those about which 
we can form no reliable memory beliefs. And any object which no-one 
can remember is one to which no-one can testify. No doubt the Grail 
remains "undiscovered" because it has some such property. 
Defenders of MP, like Alston, will be quick to point out that God, if 
God exists, cannot reflect light, emit odors, resist the touch of a hand, 
reflect sound waves; hence God cannot be tasted, seen, smelled, heard or 
touched. 
Some more terminological legerdemain. An object-imposed con-
straint is a limitation on the way in which cognitive agents of a certain 
sort can reliably form beliefs about a certain kind of object, a limitation 
which obtains because of the kind of causal interactions into which that 
object's characteristics enable (or do not enable) that object to enter. 
VII 
Reliable belief-formation requires causal connection of some sort 
between objects and agents with the requisite causal properties. So long as 
it is possible for an agent to form beliefs about an object reliably (e.g., agent-
imposed constraints do not render that object inaccessible), then any epis-
temic norm which requires of an agent that she enter into causal relations 
with that object into which she cannot enter because of object-imposed con-
straints is epistemically indefensible. And this for two reasons. 
First, to require of an agent that she forms beliefs about an object in a 
reliable manner whilst evaluating her actions in light of epistemic norms 
which presuppose that she can enter into causal relations with that 
object into which she cannot enter is to require the impossible. But 
ought implies can; it is irrational to require of an agent that she perform 
an action she cannot perform. Hence, any norm which presupposes of 
an agent that she can enter into causal relations into which she cannot 
enter is irrational. Rather, an epistemic norm is rationally defensible 
only if it requires of an agent that she perform those actions it is possible 
for her to perform. 
To require of an agent that she evaluate bird-beliefs in light of the 
checking procedures apposite to the checking of plant-beliefs presup-
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poses that she can enter into the kind of causal relationship to birds 
which is a condition of the possibility of reliably forming beliefs about 
plants. But because birds move around a lot, no actual human being can 
relate to birds like she can relate to plants. (Unless, of course, the birds 
about which she forms beliefs are deceased.) Similarly, to require of 
beliefs about God that they be based upon grounds of the sort on which 
we ought to base our beliefs about planetary objects would be to require 
of an agent that she enter into causal relations with God she cannot, 
quite literally, in the nature of the case enter. God, not being a physical 
object, cannot reflect light and thus cannot stimulate our visual appara-
tus in the manner appropriate to planets and stars. 
Second, it is unreasonable to require of agents who engage in a DP 
that they adhere to norms in light of which the beliefs so formed cannot 
but be judged as epistemically unjustified, even if those beliefs have 
been highly reliably formed. The norms in light of which we evaluate 
our beliefs must be sufficiently sensitive to enable us to detect whether 
those beliefs have been reliably formed or not - what other epistemo-
logically sound justification could we produce for such a norm? 
Evaluating beliefs formed in a DP in light of norms they cannot but fail 
even if that DP is reliable is hardly an adequate way of discriminating 
between reliably and unreliably formed beliefs! But this is precisely 
what the critic does when she does not allow "the characteristics of the 
object to constrain how cognitive agents form beliefs about that object./I 
Even if an agent is forming beliefs about an object in the appropriate 
manner, and thus is causally related to the object of belief in the manner 
apposite to objects and agents of that kind, the critic requires of her that 
she adhere to norms which would rule reliably formed beliefs out of 
epistemic bounds. To rig the game so that it is impossible for beliefs 
formed in a practice - even if reliable - to pass evaluative muster lacks 
any epistemic merit. 
What is the relevance of the two previous points to the status of the 
Ontological Principle? If certain norms lack epistemic merit because 
they require of an agent that she perform the impossible, and if what is 
impossible by way of reliable belief formation is determined in part by 
an object's characteristics (capacity to fly, incorporeality, essential sub-
jectivity, etc), then the fact that certain norms lack epistemic merit is a 
consequence, in part, of an object's characteristics. But that is just a 
longwinded way of claiming that the Ontological Principle is true. 
Let me sum up by laying out in its essentials the argument in support 
of the Ontological Principle. 
0) In order reliably to form beliefs about a given object, an agent 
must acquire information about that object. 
(2) In order to acquire information about a given object, an agent 
must be causally connected to that object. 
(3) Hence, in order reliably to form beliefs about a given object, 
an agent must be causally connected to that object. 
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In order for an agent to be causally related to a given object, 
that object must have the requisite causal properties and 
she must have access to the requisite doxastic practices. 
Hence, in order for an agent reliably to form beliefs about a 
given object, that about which she forms beliefs must have 
the requisite causal properties and she must have access to 
the requisite doxastic practices. (Reliable belief-formation 
requires causal connection between objects and agents.) 
If reliable belief-formation requires causal connection 
between objects and agents, then any epistemic norm which 
requires of an agent that she enter into causal relations into 
which she cannot enter, whether because of practice or 
object-imposed constraints, is epistemically indefensible. 
Hence, any epistemic norm which requires of an agent 
that she enter into causal relations in which she cannot 
enter is epistemically indefensible. 
If the causal relations into which an agent can enter are 
determined in part by the nature of a putative object of 
belief, whether or not an epistemic norm is epistemically 
defensible depends in part upon the nature of that about 
which an agent forms beliefs. 
Hence, whether or not an epistemic norm is defensible 
depends in part upon the nature of that about which an 
agent forms beliefs. 
VIII 
Return to the topic with which we began this essay. Comparison criticism 
of religious belief proceeds by way of (1) identifying those practices at the 
core of our cognitive life, (2) isolating those features of our core practices 
which account for their reliability, and (3) determining whether or not other 
practices which ought to have those features have at least their functional 
equivalents. The danger with this kind of argument is that we risk imposing 
on one practice the expectations legitimately required only of other practices. 
Otherwise put, the drawback with comparison criticism is that we have a 
very difficult time determining whether or not a feature indicating reliability 
for one practice indicates unreliability for those which lack that feature. 
The Ontological Principle provides us with some principled guidance for 
resolving disputes over that matter. Reliable belief-formation requires causal 
connection between knower and known. Because different kinds of object 
enter into different kinds of causal relation, the kind of relationship between 
knower and known required for reliable belief-formation varies from one 
practice to another. We may determine whether or not a given epistemic 
norm is properly imposed on a given practice by asking (1) is it possible for 
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an agent who forms beliefs about an object to enter into a causal relationship 
with that object of the sort presupposed by the norm in question?; and (2) 
would an agent who adhered to that norm be forced to conclude that she 
was forming beliefs inappropriately whether or not she was in fact forming 
her beliefs reliably? If "no" in the first case and "yes" in the second, then the 
norm in question lacks epistemic merit. 
And this provides the apologist with a strategy for defending reli-
gious practices from comparison criticism. Faced with such a critique, 
and thus with the claim that a practice lacks features it ought to have if it 
is to provide access to the truth, the apologist may show that the defi-
ciency seized upon by the critic as an indication of unreliability is a legit-
imate difference in virtue of its being a natural consequence of the 
nature of that about which she forms beliefs. The "deficiency" is in fact 
a legitimate difference; things may be going just as they epistemically 
ought if God is as practitioners of that practice believe God is. 
IX 
I do not want to pretend that all of the issues raised in this essay have 
been resolved successfully. There are numerous questions which remain. 
Three are crucially important. First, are there more general grounds for 
the claim that reliable belief-formation requires a causal relation between 
subject and object other than the ad hoc considerations I mentioned 
above? For example, could we show that at least de re belief requires 
causal relations between believer and believed since, to believe anything 
of an object at all, an agent must be able to refer to that object, and the ref-
erence of de re beliefs is fixed by causal relations of some sort? 
Second, the causal relation requirement only explains the legitimate 
differences between the kinds of beliefs which require causal relations; 
some kinds of belief do not seem to require causal relations and yet the 
doxastic practices on the basis of which we form these beliefs are legiti-
mately different from other doxastic practices. How do we account for 
those legitimate differences? Moral knowledge would not seem to 
require of an agent that she be causally related to some object; hence we 
cannot explain the difference between the way in which we ought to 
form moral beliefs and the way we ought to form sense-perceptual 
beliefs by appeal to some difference in the causal properties of the 
objects of moral beliefs and those of sense-perceptual beliefs. 
Third, does employment of the Ontological Principle risk epistemic 
anarchy? If the nature of an object constrains the way we ought to form 
beliefs about it, who is in a position to determine what the nature of a 
given object is? Trivially, only those who form beliefs about it. But that 
means that the very people who have a vested interest in the epistemic 
respectability of some doxastic practice determine which standards are 
appropriately employed to evaluate that practice (albeit indirectly). And 
that is problematic because it would inhibit any significant external cri-
tique of a given doxastic practice. 
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